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Abstract
I study credence goods markets when an expert is either selfish or conscientious.
A selfish expert is a profit maximizer. A conscientious expert wants to maximize
profit and repair the consumer’s problem. In a monopoly model, there are two
classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equilibria. A
consumer cannot infer the expert’s type from his price list in a uniform-price equi-
librium but can do that in a nonuniform-price equilibrium. Both classes of equilibria
have a social loss from an unresolved serious problem. In a uniform-price equilib-
rium, the selfish expert refuses to treat the serious problem because the price is too
low to cover the treatment cost. In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer
sometimes rejects the serious treatment offer made by the selfish expert because the
price is too high. The uniform-price equilibria will be sustained in a competitive
market while the nonuniform-price equilibria will collapse in a competitive market.
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1 Introduction
Consider the Check Engine light of your car turns on. It may be triggered by a minor
problem like a loose gas cap or it may be triggered by a serious problem in the engine. After
diagnosis, a mechanic tells you to replace the engine sensor. If you take his offer, after a
repair, the light is off. You never get to know whether tightening your gas cap could have
been enough to solve the problem. To make matters worse, you may not be able to verify
whether the engine sensor is replaced as promised. This asymmetric information appears
not only in automobile repair market but also in health care market, legal consulting
market and many other markets. In these markets, a buyer cannot evaluate the quality
of a product even after he has consumed it (Darby, 1973). These markets are termed
credence goods markets. They are the object of this paper.
Asymmetric information in credence goods markets allows an expert to exploit a con-
sumer by exaggerating the problem. The existing literature has studied various mecha-
nisms preventing a profit maximizing expert from cheating. It has been found that when
consumers search among experts (Wolinsky, 1993) or sometimes reject the expensive re-
pair offer (Fong, 2005), an expert will honestly report the nature of the problem for fear
of losing consumers. However, these mechanisms are two-edged-swords; both consumer
search and consumer rejection result in a social loss. Hence, the promotion of professional
morals is very important in credence goods markets. In fact, both the health care industry
and the automobile repair industry have their professional ethic code. The question of
interest in this paper is what will be the market outcome when some experts are ethical.
This paper departs from the existing credence goods literature by including both selfish
and conscientious types of expert in a market. The selfish expert is a profit maximizer.
The conscientious expert’s utility comes from profit and repairing the consumer’s problem.
This assumption has different interpretations.
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First, an expert may be altruistic. Harvard Medical School asks students to pair with
patients. Each medical student follows along on the patient’s visits to her specialists. The
objective of the exercise is that walking in patients’ shoes may teach students to care.
Time magazine comments on this, saying, “At Harvard and other medical schools across
the country, educators are beginning to realize that empathy is as valuable as any clinical
skill.”1 It is hard to believe that every student trained by this doctrine will become a
doctor who merely wants to maximize profit.
Second, an expert may get satisfaction from work itself. Psychologists and sociologists
have recognized for a long time that job satisfaction stems not only from financial rewards
but also from intrinsic motivations. Herzberg (1959) claims that a worker’s motivation is
related to two factors: motivators and hygiene. Motivators include achievement, the work
itself, recognition, responsibility and advancement. The hygiene elements include salary,
company policies, supervision, interpersonal relations and working conditions. Friedlan-
der (1964), Ewen (1966), Wernimont (1966), and Knoop (1994) show that motivators are
positively correlated with job satisfaction and have significant influence on work perfor-
mance.
In this paper I ask the following research questions. How does the presence of a
conscientious expert influence the selfish expert’s behavior? Can the consumer identify
the type of the expert by either pricing or recommendation strategies? What is the nature
of a social loss, if there is any, when there are two types of expert?
In the model, there is a monopoly expert and a consumer. In line with Wolinsky
(1993), Fong (2005) , Emons (1997, 2001) and Alger and Salanie (2006), it is assumed
that the consumer either has a minor problem or a serious problem, but he does not know
which one it is. The novelty of my model is that the expert can be one of two types: the
conscientious type or the selfish type. The expert knows his type and posts a price list for
1“Teaching Doctors to Care”, TIME, May 29, 2006
3
the possible repairs. The consumer visits the expert. The expert then learns the nature
of the problem and either refuses to provide a repair or offers to repair the problem at
a price chosen from the posted prices. Upon hearing a recommendation, the consumer
decides whether to accept the repair offer. If the consumer accepts the repair offer, his
problem is resolved at the quoted price.
There are two classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equi-
libria. In a uniform-price equilibrium, both types of expert post the same single price;
therefore, the consumer cannot distinguish the expert’s type by price. The conscientious
expert repairs both problems, whereas the selfish expert only repairs the minor problem.
When the selfish expert treats the minor problem, he overcharges the consumer; that is,
he charges a price higher than the consumer’s willingness to pay for the minor problem.
Uniform-price equilibria are the main finding of this paper. The intuition behind a
uniform-price equilibrium is the following. The single price results in a positive profit for
the conscientious expert when the problem is minor and a loss when the problem is serious,
but he will repair both problems. If the conscientious expert’s profit from repairing the
minor problem is high enough, the selfish expert will mimic him by posting the same
single price; the selfish expert will then repair the minor problem but reject the serious
problem to avoid a loss. Essentially, the selfish expert free rides on the conscientious
expert and behaves even more opportunistically than he would have if he were the only
expert in the market.
In sharp contrast to Pitchik and Schotter (1987) , Wolinsky (1993) and Fong’s (2005)
results, in a uniform-price equilibrium the social loss results from a selfish expert’s rejec-
tion rather than a consumer’s rejection. This result fits the anecdotal evidence of dumping
in health care markets. The price in health care market is regulated and the fixed price
is often blamed for the dumping behavior. The uniform-price equilibrium predicts that
dumping may not be avoided even when hospitals can set prices freely.
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In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer can infer the expert’s type by his
price list. The conscientious expert posts a single price and repairs both problems. The
selfish expert posts different prices. He recommends the high price when the problem is
serious; he randomizes between recommending the high price and the low price when the
problem is minor. The consumer accepts the low price offer and rejects the high price
offer with a positive probability. The conscientious expert’s single price is sufficiently low
so that the selfish expert would not post that price even if the consumer accepts it with
probability one. The conscientious expert gets a high utility from repairing the problem.
Hence, he would not copy the selfish expert’s price list, trading off a higher acceptance
rate for a higher profit. The consumer rejects the selfish expert’s serious treatment offer
with a positive probability to prevent the selfish expert from always misreporting a minor
problem as the serious problem.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the social loss is due to the consumer’s rejection.
When the consumer can infer the expert’s identity from his price list, naturally the selfish
expert will just do the best for him as if he were the only type of expert in the market.
The selfish expert’s equilibrium strategy is similar to that in Pitchik and Schotter (1987)
and Fong (2005).
Pitchik and Schotter (1987) study an expert’s fraudulent behavior in a setting with
exogenously given prices. They find a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the expert
randomizes between lying and telling the truth. This equilibrium is similar to any
nonuniform-price equilibrium.
Emons (1997, 2001) assumes that consumers can verify whether the recommended
service is delivered by the expert. Hence, cheating becomes costly. In his equilibrium, an
expert never cheats. In my paper, the consumer cannot verify whether the recommended
service is performed and therefore the selfish expert is more tempted to cheat.
Wolinsky (1993) studies market equilibrium in a competitive setting where the con-
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sumer can consult multiple experts by incurring a search cost. He finds that consumer
search and reputation concern may reduce an expert’s fraudulent behavior. He identifies
a specialization equilibrium in which some experts repair a minor problem while others
repair a serious problem. A uniform-price equilibrium resembles Wolinsky’s specialization
equilibrium in the sense that the selfish expert only repairs the minor problem and the
conscientious expert repairs both problems. The social loss in a uniform-price equilib-
rium is, however, different from that in Wolinsky. In Wolinksy, consumer search results
in a social loss whereas in a uniform-price equilibrium, the selfish expert’s rejection of a
treatment for the serious problem results in a social loss.
My article is related to Fong (2005). The main result in Fong is that the selfish expert
never misreports a minor problem as a serious one, but the consumer sometimes rejects
the serious treatment offer. The market inefficiency results from the consumer’s rejection
because the price is so high that it extracts the entire consumer surplus. My paper
models both selfish and conscientious experts. In contrast to Fong’s result, I identify
another source of market inefficiency stemming from the selfish expert’s refusal to repair
the serious problem. The selfish expert does so because the price is too low to cover the
treatment cost for the serious problem. These results contrast strongly against those in
Fong (2005).
In a fixed price setting, Marty (1999) studies a two period model when there are
both selfish and honest experts. He finds that the existence of honest experts reduces
selfish experts’ fraudulent behavior. In sharp contrast with Marty, my model shows
that the selfish expert may free ride on the conscientious expert and behaves even more
opportunistically than he would have if he were the only expert in the market.
Other studies about with multiple types of agents are also related to my article. Alger
and Renault (2007) study a principal-agent model when the agent is either honest or
opportunistic. An honest agent reports his ability truthfully to the principal while an
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opportunistic agent may misreport his ability to maximize material payoff. They examine
the optimal contract when the agent has two dimensional private information: his type
and his ability. My model is different from theirs in the following ways. First, in their
model, it is the uninformed party, the principal, who moves first by offering a contract
to the agent. In my model, it is the informed party, the expert, who moves first by
offering a price list. Second, in their model the honest agent commits to reporting his
ability truthfully to the principal, while the conscientious expert does not commit to being
honest about the consumer’s problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 derives the uniform-price and nonuniform-price equilibria. Section 4 discusses market
equilibrium in a competitive setting. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Players and payoff functions
There are two players in the model, a monopoly expert and a consumer. The consumer
has either a serious problem or a minor problem. The problem is serious with probability
α, with α ∈ (0, 1). Let s denote the serious problem and m denote the minor problem.
If problem i ∈ {m, s} is left unresolved, the consumer suffers a loss li, with lm < ls. The
consumer’s utility of having the problem unrepaired is −li. If he accepts a repair offer at
price p, his payoff is −p.
The expert is either a conscientious type or a selfish type. The selfish expert only
cares about profit; his payoff from repairing problem i at price p is p − ri, where ri is
the treatment cost for problem i, with rm < rs. The conscientious expert cares about
both profit and the consumer’s well being; his payoff from repairing problem i at price p is
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p−ri+kli, where k denotes the degree of conscientiousness. When k = 0, the conscientious
expert becomes the selfish expert. As k increases, the conscientious expert’s utility from
repairing the problem rises. This paper studies what incentives a few conscientious experts
may create for the selfish experts; therefore, the conscientious expert’s motive needs to be
sufficiently different from that of the selfish expert. Assume that k ≥ rs
ls
. When k ≥ rs
ls
,
the conscientious expert will repair the serious problem for free. An expert’s payoff is zero
if he does not repair the problem.
In line with earlier literature, I assume that it is efficient to repair both problems, i.e.,
0 < ri < li, i ∈ {m, s}. Let E(l) ≡ αls + (1 − α)lm. The equilibria under the condition
E(l) < rs are analyzed in sections 3 and 4. The case of E(l) > rs is discussed in section
4.
2.2 Information structure
It is common knowledge that the consumer has a serious problem with probability α,
with 0 < α < 1, and that the expert is a conscientious type with probability λ, with
0 < λ < 1. The consumer knows that he has a problem but does not know if it is serious
or minor. After diagnosing the problem, the expert learns whether it is serious or minor,
but this remains his private information. If the expert repairs the problem i ∈ {m, s}, the
consumer only knows that his problem is solved but does not know which treatment cost
ri is incurred. Implicitly, I have assumed that the resolution of a problem is a verifiable
or contractible event, but the type of repair for the resolution is not.
2.3 Extensive form
I consider the following extensive form game.
• Stage 1: Nature decides the severity of the consumer’s problem, li, i ∈ {m, s}, and
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the expert’s type, according to the probabilities α and λ respectively.
• Stage 2: Nature informs the expert of his type; this information is unknown to the
consumer. Then the expert posts a price list (pm, ps), with pm ≤ ps.
• Stage 3: The expert observes the severity of the consumer’s problem; the severity
is unknown to the consumer. The expert either declines to repair the consumer’s
problem, or offers to treat the consumer at a price taken from his price list (pm, ps).
• Stage 4: If a price pi is offered by the expert, the consumer decides whether to
accept the repair offer. If the consumer accepts, he pays the price pi, a repair is
performed and the problem is resolved.
3 The equilibria
Different equilibria may yield the same equilibrium outcome. For example, in one equi-
librium, the expert posts two different prices (pm, ps) and always recommends ps. This
equilibrium outcome is equivalent to the equilibrium outcome of another equilibrium in
which the expert posts a single price ps and always recommends it. To simplify the anal-
ysis, the expert is restricted to post only prices that are recommended with a positive
probability. Consequently, the conscientious expert always posts a single price in an equi-
librium. Under the assumption k > rs
ls
, the conscientious expert will never recommend a
price which will be rejected with a positive probability. Suppose he posts two different
prices (pm, ps), where pm < ps. If the consumer always accepts both prices, the consci-
entious expert will always recommend the high price, ps, because he wants to maximize
profit besides repairing the problem.
An expert will never set a price below rm or above ls. Any price p > ls will be rejected
by the consumer. Any price p < rm will be accepted by the consumer but will yield a
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smaller profit than p′ = p + ², for a sufficiently small ² > 0. Therefore there is no loss of
generality restricting experts to posting their prices in the range of [rm, ls].
Recall that the following analysis is under the assumption E(l) < rs. This implies
rm < lm < rs < ls. In this section, two classes of equilibrium outcomes are identified:
uniform-price equilibrium outcomes and nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes. I first
characterize the uniform-price equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. (Uniform-price Equilibria). There is a continuum of equilibrium out-
comes in which both types of expert post the same single price. An equilibrium outcome is
indexed by p ∈ [lm, p], with p = αλls+(1−α)lmαλ+(1−α) . In such an equilibrium, both types of expert
post a single price p. The conscientious expert always offers to repair the problem at price
p. The selfish expert offers to repair the minor problem at price p; he declines to repair
the serious problem. The consumer always accepts the repair offer p.
When both types of expert post the same price list p, the consumer cannot infer the
identity of the expert from a repair offer at p. Given the expert’s equilibrium strategy,
the consumer updates his belief about having a serious problem by Bayes’ rule after being
recommended p; his expected loss from the problem is E(l|p) = αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) . Since E(l|p)
is at least the price charged by the expert, the consumer will accept this repair offer.
A uniform-price equilibrium is supported by the following consumer beliefs after an
off-equilibrium repair offer p′ 6= p. If p′ < p, the consumer believes that the expert is
conscientious and, accordingly, his problem is serious with probability α, the prior. If
p′ > p, the consumer believes that the expert is selfish. In addition, if p < p′ < rs, the
consumer believes that his problem is minor; if rs ≤ p′ ≤ ls, he believes that the problem
is serious with probability α.
The consumer with such beliefs is a pessimist in the sense that he regards the expert
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as selfish if he is recommended an off-equilibrium price higher than the equilibrium price.
The pessimist’s beliefs can be justified by the following argument: When the conscientious
expert’s benefit from repairing the problem is sufficiently large, he will not bear the risk of
rejection in exchange for a higher profit by raising the repair offer above p. In comparison
with the conscientious expert, the selfish expert has a stronger incentive to deviate to a
price above p.
The consumer’s belief about the nature of the problem must be consistent with his
belief about the expert’s type. A conscientious expert will always repair the consumer’s
problem. Hence, the consumer will not update his belief about the nature of the problem
if he is recommended p′ < p. When p′ is greater than p, the consumer believes that the
expert is the selfish type who will not repair the problem when the quoted price is smaller
than the treatment cost. Hence, when p′ is smaller than rs, the serious treatment cost,
the consumer believes that he has a minor problem. When p′ is at least rs, the selfish
expert will always offer to repair a problem at p′. Hence, the consumer’s belief about
having a serious problem remains the prior, α.
According to the consumer’s off-equilibrium beliefs, he will accept a repair offer below
p and reject a repair offer above p. The consumer accepts p in equilibrium. Clearly,
he will accept p′ lower than p because he believes that it is offered by the conscientious
expert. If the consumer is recommended p′ ∈ (p, rs), his expected loss, lm, is smaller than
p′, therefore he will reject such a repair offer. If the consumer is recommended p′ ≥ rs,
his expected loss E(l), which is less than rs, is smaller than p
′. Hence, the consumer will
reject this repair offer as well. Given the consumer’s optimal strategy after a repair offer
p′, there is no profitable price deviation for both types of expert.
The condition E(l) < rs implies that p is higher than the treatment cost for the
minor problem, rm, and lower than the treatment cost for the serious problem, rs. The
conscientious expert repairs the problem even if it turns out to be serious. The selfish
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expert will decline to treat the serious problem and overcharge the consumer for the minor
problem; that is, the selfish expert charges the consumer a price higher than his loss from
the minor problem if the problem is indeed minor.
Uniform-price equilibria survive the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. The conscientious
expert cannot deviate to a higher price and convince the consumer to accept the deviation.
Suppose the conscientious expert deviates to p′ > p. The most favorable reaction he can
expect from the consumer is to accept p′ with probability one. However, if the consumer
accepts p′ with probability one, the selfish expert will also deviate to offering p′. By the
same logic, the selfish expert cannot deviate to a higher price and convince the consumer
to accept the price.
The upper bound of the uniform equilibrium price is αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) , which increases in
both λ and α. When the expert is more likely to be conscientious or the consumer is
more likely to have a serious problem, the expected loss from the problem conditional
on the recommendation p is higher. The consumer’s willingness to pay becomes higher
accordingly. When λ, the fraction of the conscientious expert, is one, the expert will
charge E(l) and always repair the consumer’s problem. This equilibrium is efficient and
allows the expert to take away the entire social surplus.
The existence of the conscientious expert creates an incentive for the selfish expert to
cream skim the consumer with a minor problem and dump the consumer with a serious
problem. The unsolved serious problem creates a social loss due to the fact that the uni-
form price is too low for the selfish expert to cover the serious treatment cost. This result
is in sharp contrast to Fong and Wolinsky’s results wherein the consumer’s equilibrium
strategy results in a social loss. In Fong, the consumer sometimes rejects the serious
problem treatment offer and creates a social loss. The rationale behind the consumer’s
rejection is that the price for the serious problem is so high that if the consumer accepts
it with probability one, the selfish expert will always misreport the minor problem as the
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serious one. In Wolinksy, when search cost is low, a consumer rejects the first serious
repair offer and searches for another expert. Consumer search prevents an expert from
lying but results in a social loss.
Uniform-price equilibrium outcomes are ranked by efficiency and profitability in Corol-
lary 1 and Corollary 2, respectively.
Corollary 1. Uniform-price equilibrium outcomes are equally efficient.
Under the condition ri < li, i ∈ {m, s}, it is socially efficient to have both problems
repaired. I measure market inefficiency as the social loss from an unresolved problem. In a
uniform-price equilibrium, a minor problem is always repaired whereas a serious problem
remains unresolved with probability 1 − λ. The social inefficiency of a uniform-price
equilibrium is therefore α(1− λ)(ls− rs). The distinctions among unform-price equilibria
are the distributions of wealth between the consumer and the expert.
Corollary 2. The most profitable uniform-price equilibrium outcome is one in which both
types of expert post a single price p = αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) .
In a uniform-price equilibrium, both types of expert post the same price p in [lm, p],
and the consumer always accepts a repair offer at p. Clearly, both types of expert’s profits
reach the maximum at p.
Thus far, the equilibria in which both types of expert post the same price are charac-
terized. Next, I will characterize other equilibria in which different type of expert posts a
different price list.
Proposition 2. (Nonuniform-price Equilibria) There is a continuum of equilibrium out-
comes in which each type of expert posts a different price list. An equilibrium outcome
is indexed by ps ∈ [rs, ls] and pc ∈ [lm, pc], with pc = lm + α1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ). In the
equilibrium, the selfish expert posts a price list (lm, ps). In state s, the selfish expert offers
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to repair the problem at ps; in state m, he offers to repair the problem at ps with probability
β = α(ls−ps)
(1−α)(ps−lm) , and repair the problem at lm with probability 1 − β. The conscientious
expert posts a single price pc, and always offers to repair the problem at pc. The consumer
accepts lm and pc with probability one; he accepts ps with probability γ =
lm−rm
ps−rm .
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the expert’s identity is revealed by his price list.
If recommended a single price pc, the consumer knows the expert is conscientious and
believes that his problem is serious with probability α, the prior. Because the expected
loss from the problem, E(l), is greater than pc, the consumer will always accept a repair
offer at pc.
The selfish expert posts two different prices (lm, ps). When ps is smaller than ls, both
the selfish expert and the consumer play a mixed strategy in equilibrium. If the selfish
expert is always honest, that is, he recommends lm when the problem is minor and ps
when it is serious, the consumer will accept both lm and ps. Then the selfish expert
will deviate to always recommending ps. If the selfish expert always recommends ps,
the consumer will always reject ps because his willingness to pay is lower than the offer.
Then, the selfish expert has a profitable deviation to recommending lm when the problem
is minor. Hence, in equilibrium, when the problem is minor, the selfish expert misreports
the minor problem as the serious problem with probability β, and the consumer accepts ps
with probability γ. In the extreme case, when ps = ls, the selfish expert is always honest
but the consumer still rejects the more expensive offer, ls, with a positive probability to
prevent the expert from lying. The selfish expert’s equilibrium strategy in the extreme
case is the same as that in Fong’s model.
A nonuniform-price equilibrium is supported by the consumer’s beliefs after an off-
equilibrium price p′ /∈ {pc}
⋃{(lm, ps)} is recommended. If p′ < pc, the consumer believes
that the expert is conscientious with probability one and the problem is serious with
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probability α. If p′ > pc, the consumer believes that the expert is selfish. In addition, he
believes that his problem is minor for p′ ∈ (pc, rs) and is serious with probability α for
p′ ∈ [rs, ls]. The justification for the consumer’s beliefs after a repair offer p′ > pc is the
same as in the analysis for Proposition 1. According to the consumer’s beliefs, his optimal
strategy in the continuation game following p′ is to accept p′ < pc and reject p′ > pc.
Given the consumer and the conscientious expert’s equilibrium strategies, the selfish
expert does not have a profitable deviation . The conscientious expert’s prices, pc, is so
low that the selfish expert does not want to post pc even if it is accepted with probability
one. Clearly, a price deviation p′ 6= pc is not profitable.
Given the consumer and the selfish expert’s strategies, the conscientious expert does
not have a profitable deviation. The conscientious expert will not mimic the selfish ex-
pert’s price list (lm, ps). A repair offer at ps is not attractive for the conscientious expert
because it will be rejected with a positive probability. A repair offer at lm will be accepted
but is less profitable than the conscientious expert’s equilibrium repair offer, pc. A price
deviation p′ 6= (lm, ps) is not profitable as well.
The set of nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes can be reduced by the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion.
Corollary 3. Nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes that satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive
criterion are those in which the selfish expert posts (lm, ps), with ps ∈ [rs, ls] and the
conscientious expert posts pc = pc = lm +
α
1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ).
When the conscientious expert’s price is pc, the selfish expert is indifferent between
posting (lm, ps) and pc. Consider a nonuniform-price equilibrium outcome in which pc <
pc. The conscientious expert can deviate to posting pc
′ = pc + ², with ² positive but
arbitrarily close to zero. If the selfish expert recommends pc
′, the most favorable response
he can expect from the consumer is to accept pc
′ with probability one. Because pc′ < pc,
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the selfish expert’s highest possible profit from recommending pc
′ is strictly less than
his equilibrium profit. Hence, the consumer should be convinced that he is seeing the
conscientious expert upon being recommended pc
′ and therefore should accept pc′ with
probability one.
When ps increases, the selfish expert misreports the minor problem as the serious one
less frequently and the consumer rejects ps more frequently. When the serious repair offer
becomes more expensive, a small probability of lying may trigger a full rejection from the
consumer. Thus the selfish expert becomes more cautious. As ps increases, the consumer
knows that the selfish expert has a larger incentive to misreport the minor problem as the
serious problem. Hence, he will reject the serious treatment offer more often.
The conscientious expert’s price pc increases in γ, the consumer’s acceptance rate of
the serious repair offer, and α
1−α , the odds ratio for the serious problem to happen. When
the consumer accepts the serious repair offer more frequently or the problem is more likely
to be serious, the selfish expert’s profit from posting (lm, ps) is higher. This allows the
conscientious expert to charge a higher price.
The Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion has reduced the set of nonuniform-price equilibrium
outcomes. All remaining nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes are indexed by ps, with
ps ∈ [rs, ls]. In the following analysis, I characterize the efficiency and profitability of the
equilibrium outcomes that have survived the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
Corollary 4. In the continuum of nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes, the most prof-
itable equilibrium outcome coincides with the most efficient equilibrium outcome. In the
equilibrium, the selfish expert posts a price list (lm, ls). He recommends lm when the prob-
lem is minor and recommends ls when it is serious. The conscientious expert posts a single
price pc and always recommends pc. The consumer accepts pc and lm with probability one;
he accepts ls with probability γ
∗ = lm−rm
ls−rm .
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The selfish expert’s equilibrium strategies in the most profitable nonuniform-price
equilibrium are the same as in Fong. In Fong’s model, there is only one selfish expert who
posts a price list before seeing the consumer. His model has a proper subgame after each
price list. Therefore the selfish expert chooses the most profitable price list (lm, ls) in the
unique SPNE outcome.
In a nonuniform-equilibrium outcome, the selfish expert’s profit is
pis(lm, ps) = α(ps − rs)( lm − rm
ps − rm ) + (1− α)(lm − rm).
Under the assumption E(l) < rs, pis increases in ps. Raising the price for the serious
problem ps has two effects. A higher ps results in a higher profit margin for repairing
the serious problem. Meanwhile, a higher ps may trigger a higher rejection rate by the
consumer because the consumer knows that the expert has an incentive to misreport
the minor problem as the serious problem when ps is high. The gain in profit margin
dominates the loss of rejection. Hence, pis reaches the maximum at ps = ls.
The conscientious expert always repairs the problem in a nonuniform-price equilib-
rium. Thus his rank of the equilibrium outcomes is also determined by the profit. The
conscientious expert’s profit is
pic(pc) = pc − [αrs + (1− α)rm].
Because pc increases in ps, pic(pc) increases in ps as well. Therefore, both types of expert’s
payoffs reach the maximum at ps = ls.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium outcome, the conscientious expert always repairs the
problem. The social loss results from the consumer’s rejection of the serious treatment
recommendation, ps, offered by the selfish expert. The social loss of a nonuniform-price
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equilibrium outcome is
W ≡ (1− λ)[α(ls − rs) + (1− α)β(lm − rm)](1− γ),
where β is the selfish expert’s probability of recommending ps when the problem is minor
and γ is the consumer’s probability of accepting ps. Substituting β =
α(ls−ps)
(1−α)(ps−lm) and
γ = lm−rm
ps−rm by their equilibrium values yields
W =
(1− λ)α[ps(ls − rs − lm + rm) + lmrs − lsrm]
ps − rm .
The derivative of W with respect to ps is −α(1−λ)(lm−rm)(rs−rm)(ps−rm)2 , which is negative. Hence,
the most efficient equilibrium outcome is the one in which ps = ls.
When ps increases, two conflicting forces influence efficiency. When ps gets bigger, the
consumer will reject ps more often; hence, the serious problem is less likely to be resolved.
This leads to a larger social loss. However, when ps is higher, the selfish expert is less likely
to misreport the minor problem as the serious problem. Therefore, the minor problem
has a higher chance to be resolved. The efficiency gain from the minor problem exceeds
the efficiency loss from the serious problem; consequently, the efficiency increases in ps.
The social loss of a nonuniform-price equilibrium results from the interaction between the
consumer and the selfish expert. In equilibrium, the selfish expert takes the entire social
surplus from repairing the problem when the repair offer is accepted. Hence, the efficiency
of an equilibrium outcome is aligned with the profitability of the equilibrium outcome.
4 Discussion
In sections 3, I have analyzed equilibria under the assumption E(l) < rs. Under the
alternative assumption, E(l) ≥ rs, there is a unique equilibrium which is efficient. In
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the equilibrium, both types of expert post a single price E(l) and always recommend to
repair the problem at this price; the consumer will accept E(l) with probability one. When
E(l) < rs, a social loss rises in either uniform-price or nonuniform-price equilibria. This
is because the selfish expert cannot credibly commit to always repairing the consumer’s
problem at E(l). Although committing to repairing both problems at E(l) allows the
selfish expert to extract the maximum possible social surplus, ex post he always refuses
to repair the serious problem at E(l). When E(l) ≥ rs, the selfish expert’s ex ante and
ex post incentives are aligned and, therefore, the equilibrium is efficient.
In the monopoly setting, there is always a social loss resulting from the interaction be-
tween the consumer and the selfish expert. Will the social loss disappear in a competitive
setting? Consider a market with a continuum of experts. The fraction of conscientious
experts is λ and the fraction of selfish experts is 1−λ. Take the same game structure and
allow experts to compete in price lists before a consumer’s visit. Assume the condition
E(l) < rs holds and the search cost is high so that the consumer does not search again
after being recommended a treatment offer by an expert. I require a conscientious expert
to break even ex ante.
The nonuniform-price equilibria cannot be sustained in a competitive market. In
a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer surplus from a repair by a conscientious
expert is higher than a selfish expert. Therefore, in a market with many experts, if the
consumer can infer an expert’s type, he will never visit selfish experts. The nonuniform-
price equilibria collapse.
A uniform-price equilibrium outcome may survive under some parameter configura-
tions. For example, when 0 < α < min{ rs−lm
ls−lm ,
lm−rm
rs−rm } and
(1−α)(rs−rm)
ls−αrs−(1−α)rm < λ < 1, there is
a uniform-price equilibrium outcome. In the equilibrium, each expert posts a single price
equal to the expected treatment cost αrs + (1− α)rm. Let E(r) denote αrs + (1− α)rm.
A conscientious expert always recommends this price to a consumer. A selfish expert
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recommends this price to a consumer when his problem is minor and refuses to treat the
consumer when the problem is serious. A consumer always accept a repair offer at E(r).
The condition 0 < α < min{ rs−lm
ls−lm ,
lm−rm
rs−rm } ensures that price E(r) is smaller than
lm. Hence, a consumer will always accept this repair offer. The driving force behind
this equilibrium is similar as in the monopoly setting. In a competitive setting, a selfish
expert might want to undercut his price to p′ < E(r). Doing so will signal that he is selfish
but he might gain from attracting more consumers. If a consumer visits this deviating
selfish expert, he will enjoy a lower price when his problem is minor. But the consumer
will suffer from a higher rejection rate if the problem is serious. When there are enough
conscientious experts, say, (1−α)(rs−rm)
ls−αrs−(1−α)rm < λ < 1, a consumer will never visit an expert
who posts a price lower than E(r). Hence, a selfish expert will not deviate to a lower
price. In this equilibrium, there is still a social loss equal to α(1− λ)(ls − rs).
The result that only the uniform-price equilibrium outcomes might survive in a com-
petitive market implies that price dispersion across problems may decrease in the intensity
of competition. Empirical test about this prediction might be interesting.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I study credence goods markets with selfish and conscientious experts. I
identify two classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equilibria.
In uniform-price equilibria, the consumer cannot infer the expert’s type from a price
list. The consumer’s problem will always be repaired if he is treated by a conscientious
expert. If he is treated by a selfish expert instead, only the minor problem will be resolved;
the serious problem will be rejected by the selfish expert because the price is too low to
cover the treatment cost. In a uniform-price equilibrium, the selfish expert free rides on
the conscientious expert and behaves even more opportunistically than he would have if
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he were the only expert in the market.
In nonuniform-price equilibria, the consumer can infer the expert’s type from the
posted price lists; the conscientious expert posts a single price for different repairs whereas
the selfish expert posts two different prices. The problem will be always resolved if the
expert is conscientious. If the expert is selfish, the minor problem will be repaired with
probability one but the serious problem will be left unresolved with a positive probabil-
ity. This is because the serious treatment offer is so expensive that the consumer will
sometimes reject it.
I have examined a static model with two types of expert. My future research may
be a study of a dynamic model. In a multiple-period setting, the selfish expert has a
reputation concern which may discipline his current behavior. It may be interesting to
study the selfish expert’s pricing and recommendation strategies in different periods.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is divided into 4 steps. Step 1 proves that given the
expert’s strategy described in Proposition 1, the consumer will always accept the repair
offer. Step 2 describes the consumer’s equilibrium strategy following a price deviation.
Step 3 proves that given other players’ strategies, the selfish expert’s strategy described
in Proposition 1 is optimal. Step 4 shows that given other players’ strategies, the consci-
entious expert’s strategy is optimal.
Step 1. Upon being recommended a repair offer at p ∈ [lm, αλls+(1−α)lmαλ+(1−α) ], the consumer’s
belief of having a serious problem is Pr(li = ls|p) = Pr(p|li=ls)Pr(li=ls)Pr(p|li=ls)Pr(li=ls)+Pr(p|li=lm)Pr(li=lm) ,
where Pr(p|li = ls) and Pr(p|li = lm) stand for the probability that the consumer is rec-
ommended a repair offer at p in state s and m, respectively. According to Proposition 1,
in state s, only the conscientious expert offers to repair the problem at p; in state m, both
types of expert offer to repair the problem at p. Therefore, Pr(p|li = ls) = λ, the prob-
ability of a conscientious expert, and Pr(p|li = lm) = 1. Consequently, if recommended
p, the consumer has a serious problem with probability Pr(li = ls|p) = αλαλ+(1−α) . If the
problem is left unsolved, the consumer’s expected loss is therefore αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) . Because
price p is at most αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) , the consumer will accept it.
Step 2. Now I characterize the consumer’s equilibrium strategy in the continuation
game following a deviation p′ 6= p. If recommended p′ ∈ (p, ls), the consumer believes with
probability one that he is seeing a selfish expert. In addition, he believes that his problem
is minor for p′ ∈ (p, rs) and is serious with probability α for p′ ∈ [rs, ls]. If recommended
p′ ∈ [rm, p), the consumer believes that he is seeing a conscientious expert and he has a
serious problem with probability α. Based on these beliefs, the consumer will only accept
a repair offer p′ ∈ [rm, p). Accepting a repair offer p′ ∈ (p, rs) will result in a loss lm − p′;
under assumption E(l) < rs, accepting a repair offer p
′ ∈ [rs, ls] will also result in a loss
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E(l)− p′.
Step 3. The selfish expert.
(i) In the continuation game following p, the selfish expert will make a repair offer at
p only in state m. The assumption E(l) < rs implies
αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) < rs. Since p is at most
αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) , p < rs. Therefore, the selfish expert will decline to repair the problem at p
in state s. Clearly, p is higher than the minor problem’s treatment cost, rm, and therefore
the selfish expert will recommend p in state m.
(ii) The selfish expert will post a uniform price list p ∈ [lm, αλls+(1−α)lmαλ+(1−α) ]. Any deviation
p′ < p is not profitable: given that the consumer accepts p with probability one, offering
a price p′ < p will not increase the acceptance probability but will reduce profit. Any
deviation p′ > p will be rejected and result in zero profit.
Step 4. The conscientious expert.
(i) When k ≥ rs
ls
, the conscientious expert has a positive payoff in both states by
repairing the problem at p. Therefore, he will always offer to repair the problem at p.
(ii) The conscientious expert will post p ∈ [lm, αλls+(1−α)lmαλ+(1−α) ]. The argument is similar
as that in (ii) of step 3. A deviation p′ < p cannot improve acceptance probability but
will result in a lower profit. A deviation p′ > p will be rejected by the consumer and
result in zero payoff. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is divided into 4 steps. Step 1 shows that given the
expert’s strategy specified in Proposition 2, the consumer’s strategy in Proposition 2 is
optimal. Step 2 specifies the consumer’s beliefs and equilibrium strategy after a price
deviation. Step 3 shows that given other players’ strategies, the selfish expert’s strategy
is optimal. Step 4 shows that given other players’ strategies, the conscientious expert’s
strategy is optimal.
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Step 1. The consumer’s equilibrium response.
(i) The consumer’s loss from the problem is at least lm. His surplus from accepting a
repair offer at lm is nonnegative. Hence accepting price lm is the consumer’s best response.
(ii) Next, suppose that the consumer is offered a repair at ps ∈ [rs, ls]. According to
the selfish expert’s strategy in Proposition 2, in state s, he offers to repair the problem at
ps with probability one, and in state m, offers to repair the problem at ps with probability
β. Using Bayesian updating, the consumer infers that he has a serious problem with
probability
Pr(li = ls|ps) = Pr(ps|li = ls)Pr(li = ls)
Pr(ps|li = ls)Pr(li = ls) + Pr(ps|li = lm)Pr(li = lm) ,
which says Pr(li = ls|ps) = αα+β(1−α) . So if the problem is left unresolved, the consumer’s
expected loss is αls+β(1−α)lm
α+β(1−α) . After substitution by β, this expected loss is equal to ps.
The consumer is indifferent between accepting or rejecting ps. Therefore, accepting ps
with probability γ = lm−rm
ps−rm is a best response.
(iii) Finally, suppose that the consumer is offered a repair price pc. According to the
conscientious expert’s strategy in Proposition 2, the consumer retains the prior belief, α, of
having a serious problem. When the problem is left unresolved, the consumer’s expected
loss is E(l). The assumption E(l) < rs implies that lm +
α
1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ) < E(l).
Because lm +
α
1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ) is the upper bound of pc, the consumer will accept pc
with probability one.
Step 2. The consumer’s equilibrium strategy after a price deviation.
Now I characterize the consumer’s equilibrium strategy in the continuation game fol-
lowing a price deviation p′ /∈ {(lm, ps)}
⋃{pc}. If p′ < pc, the consumer believes that the
expert is conscientious with probability one and the problem is serious with probability
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α. If p′ > pc, the consumer believes that the expert is selfish. In addition, he believes
that his problem is minor for p′ ∈ (pc, rs) and is serious with probability α for p′ ∈ [rs, ls].
Given his beliefs, the consumer’s optimal strategy in the continuation game following p′
is to accept p′ < pc and reject p′ > pc.
Step 3. The selfish expert’s equilibrium strategy.
(i) Given other players’ strategies, the selfish expert will post a price list (lm, ps),
ps ∈ [rs, ls].
First, I show that the selfish expert will not mimic the conscientious expert’s price
list. The selfish expert’s equilibrium payoff is
us(lm, ps) = α(ps − rs)( lm − rm
ps − rm ) + (1− α)(lm − rm).
If he mimics the conscientious expert’s price list pc ∈ [lm, lm + α1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm )], the
selfish expert will recommend pc only in state m since pc < rs (step 1 (iii) has shown
this). The highest payoff for the selfish expert from pc is us(pc) = (1− α)(pc − rm). The
condition pc ≤ lm + α1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ) implies us(lm, ps) ≥ us(pc).
Next I show that the selfish expert will not post a price p′ /∈ {(lm, ps)}
⋃{pc}. By
step 2, a repair price at p′ < pc will be accepted. However, such a price deviation is less
profitable than the selfish expert’s equilibrium price list. A repair price at p′ > pc will be
rejected and result in zero profit.
(ii)Given other players’ strategies, the selfish expert’s recommendation strategy in the
continuation game following (lm, ps) is optimal.
In state s, repairing the problem at ps results in a nonnegative profit
(ps−rs)γ = (ps−rs)( lm−rmps−rm ); whereas, repairing the problem at lm results in a loss lm−rs.
In state m, the selfish expert is indifferent between offering to repair the problem at
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lm and at ps. The repair offer lm is accepted with probability one and results in a positive
payoff lm − rm. The repair offer ps is accepted with probability γ and results in a payoff
(ps − rm).γ = lm − rm.
Step 4. The conscientious expert’s equilibrium strategy.
(i) Given other players’ strategies, the conscientious expert will post a single price
pc ∈ [lm, lm + α1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm )].
First I show that the conscientious expert will not mimic the selfish expert’s price list.
The conscientious expert’s equilibrium payoff is uc(pc) = pc+α(kls−rs)+(1−α)(klm−rm).
If the conscientious expert mimics the selfish expert’s price list (lm, ps), the highest payoff
he can obtain is uc(lm, ps) = lm + α(kls − rs) + (1 − α)(klm − rm); this is because when
k is sufficiently big (more precisely k ≥ rs
ls
), the conscientious expert will bear a financial
loss to repair the consumer’s problem. Clearly, uc(pc) ≥ uc(lm, ps).
I now show that the conscientious expert will not post a price p′ /∈ {(lm, ps)}
⋃{pc}.
By step 2, a price p′ < pc will be accepted, but is less profitable than pc. A price p′ > pc
will be rejected and result in zero payoff.
(ii) In the continuation game following pc, the conscientious expert will always offer to
repair the problem at pc. Again, when k is sufficiently big (k ≥ rsls ), repairing the problem
at pc results in a positive payoff in both states. Q.E.D.
References
[1] Alger, Ingela and Franc¸ois Salanie´. A Theory of Fraud and Over-Treatment in Ex-
perts Markets. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 15(4):853–881,
2006.
26
[2] Alger, Ingela and Renault, Re´gis. Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their
Word. Economic Theory, 30:291–311, 2007.
[3] Darby, M.R. and Karni, E. Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud.
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 16:pp. 67–88, 1973.
[4] Emons, W. Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts. Rand Journal of Economics,
28:pp. 107–119, 1997.
[5] Emons, W. Credence Goods Monopolists. International Journal of Industrial Orga-
nization, 19:pp. 375–389, 2001.
[6] Ewen, R., Hulin, C., Smith, P. C., and Locke, E. A. . An Empirical Test of the
Herzberg Two-Factor Theory. Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 50:pp. 544–550,
1966.
[7] Fong, Yuk-fai. When Do Experts Cheat and Whom Do They Target? RAND Journal
of Economics, Vol. 36(No. 1):pp. 113–130, Spring 2005.
[8] Friedlander, F. Job Characteristics as Satisfiers and Dissatisfiers. Journal of Applied
Psychology, Vol. 48:pp. 388–392, 1964.
[9] Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., and Snyderman, B. B. The Motivation to Work (2nd
ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959.
[10] Knoop, R. Work Values and Job Satisfaction. Journal of Psychology, Vol. 128:683–
691, 1994.
[11] Marty, Fridolin E. . The Expert-Client Information Problem. working paper, 1999.
[12] Pitchik, C. and Schotter, A. Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information. American
Economic Review, Vol. 77:pp. 1032–1036, 1987.
27
[13] Wernimont, P. F. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Factors in Job Satisfaction. Journal of
Applied Psychology, Vol. 50:pp. 41–50, 1966.
[14] Wolinsky, A. Competition in a Market for Informed Experts’ Services. RAND Journal
of Economics, Vol. 24:pp. 380–398, 1993.
28
